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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020827-CA
v.
LAWRENCE RAYMOND BALERIO,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals his convictions of one count of driving under the influence of
alcohol, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-4-44 (Supp. 2002),
and open container in a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-4-44.20(2) (Supp. 2002). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court violate due process or the guarantee against excessive fines
when it imposed a statutorily mandated fine that was well below the maximum amount it
was statutorily authorized to impose?
Standard of Review: Because defendant did not raise his constitutional challenges
below, this Court may address these issues if '"plain error' or 'exceptional circumstances'

is established;' State v Norton, 2003 UT App 88, % 10, 470 Utah Adv. Rep. 9. "If
neither applies, the court may decline to consider the issue[s]." Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following constitutional
provisions and statute, whose text is reproduced in Addendum A:
U.S. CONST, amend. VIII;
U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1;
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 7;
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 9;
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-44(6) (Supp. 2002).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State charged defendant with one count each of driving under the influence of
alcohol, a third degree felony; driving on a suspended license, and no insurance, both
class B misdemeanors; and open container in vehicle, and no registration, both class C
misdemeanors. R. 1-2. Defendant pled guilty to the driving under the influence and open
container charges. R. 14-21. In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining charges,
allowed defendant credit against his sentence for time he served in a Colorado jail, and
immediately exonerated his appearance bond. R. 18.
The trial court sentenced defendant to imprisonment for zero-to-five years and
ordered him to pay a fine of $1,850, plus interest. R. 23-24. The trial court stayed
execution of that sentence, however, and placed defendant on twenty-four months
probation under certain conditions. Id. Defendant timely appealed. R. 28.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This is the ninth time since 1971 that defendant has been charged with or
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). R. 49: 4-6.l It is also
defendant's third DUI conviction since 2001. R. 49: 6.
After he was arrested on the instant charges, defendant posted a $5,000 bond. R.
3,5. Although he filed an affidavit of indigency, the trial court found that he was not
indigent. R. 11. Defendant retained Rosalie Reilly to represent him. R. 12. He pled
guilty and the trial court ordered a PSI. R. 14, 49.
The PSI states that defendant is a certified welder, a member of the United Steel
Workers Union, and had worked for Grand Junction Steel since 1984. R. 49: 7-8. At the
time the report was prepared, however, defendant had recently lost his job. R. 49:8. The
PSI also states that defendant's financial situation was "in dire straights due to his current
legal situation." R. 49: 8. Defendant owed $2,400 in child support, a $2,500 hospital bill
resulting from a suicide attempt, and an unspecified amount on credit card bills. Id.
Defendant was living with his parents when the PSI was prepared. R. 49: 7, 9.
The investigator who prepared the report opined that defendant "has been very fortunate
to have the supportfromhis parents." R. 49: 9. Two letters were attached to the PSI. R.
49. One,fromdefendant's daughter, stated that defendant had a "large support system"
of immediate and extended family. R. 49: 13. The other, from defendant's former
employer, stated that defendant "did an outstanding job" as a welder and "recommended
1

R. 49 is a manila envelope containing the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report

(PSI).
3

[defendant] highly for future employment/' R. 49: 13. When asked to provide his
version of the offense, defendant stated, "I feel that I broke the law and that I should pay
for what I have been charged with." R. 49: 3.
The PSI recommended that defendant be placed on probation for twenty-four
months with the follov/ing conditions: (1) serve nine months in jail, but be released after
180 days if defendant had made arrangements to participate in an inpatient substance
abuse program; and (2) pay a fine of $1,825, but receive credit for $825 if defendant
successfully completed the inpatient program. R. 49: 10.2
At sentencing, defendant argued that the recommendation that he serve nine
months in jail was "harsh." R. 48: 4-5. He also argued that his hospital bill and child
support arrearage prevented him from paying any fine. R. 48: 5. Finally, he mentioned
that he had just been released early from the Mesa County Jail after serving time on a
DUI conviction. Id
In imposing sentence, the trial court followed the PSI recommendation with one
exception. R. 23-24. Although the recommendation was a fine of $1,825 and a possible
credit of $825, the trial court imposed a fine of $ 1,850, plus interest, and granted a
possible credit of up to $925 for any amount paid towards the inpatient treatment
program. Id.

2

The PSI also recommended that defendant pay a $250 recoupment fee for his
public defender. R. 49: 10. As his counsel stated at sentencing, however, she was not
representing defendant as a public defender. R. 48: 4. Consequently, the trial court did
not impose the $250 recoupment fee. R. 23-24.
4

After sentencing, defendant requested that he be granted credit for the time he
served in the Mesa County Jail in Colorado. R. 26. The trial court granted the request.
R. 41. 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's constitutional challenges to his fine are unpreserved and he fails to
argue that any exception to the preservation rule applies. Therefore, this Court should
decline to review these claims. Regardless, no ''exceptional circumstances" existed and
"plain error" did not occur because no case has held unconstitutional the imposition of a
mandatory fine that does not exceed the statutory maximum.
Even if defendant had preserved his constitutional claims they would fail on their
merits. The trial court did not deny defendant due process because it considered his
financial condition before imposing sentence. Nor did the trial court violate the guarantee
against excessive fines because it imposed a fine that did not exceed statutory limits.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REVIEW DEFENDANT'S
UNPRESERVED CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO HIS
FINE; IN ANY EVENT, THE CHALLENGES FAIL
Defendant claims that the trial court violated both the federal and state
constitutions when it imposed a fine as part of his sentence. Aplt. Br. at 4-8. According
to defendant, the trial court violated federal and state guarantees of due process when it
imposed a fine '"without consideration of defendant's ability to pay." Id. at 4. He also
1

The record does not indicate exactly how much time would be credited toward
defendant's Utah jail sentence.
5

asserts that the fine violated federal and state guarantees against excessive fines because
"the amount of the fine is so disproportionate to [his] circumstances that there can be no
realistic expectation that he will be able to pay the fine." Id. at 6. This Court should
decline to address these unpreserved claims.
A.

The Court should decline to review defendant's unpreserved
constitutional claims because he does not argue that any exception to
the preservation rule applies.

"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. Marvin, 964
P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998)). "[T]he preservation rule applies to every claim, including
constitutional questions." Id. (citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah
1996)). '"Utah courts require specific objections in order to bring all claimed errors to
the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if
appropriate.'" State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, If 14, 54 P.3d 645 (quoting State v.
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (additional quotations and citations
omitted). "The specificity requirement arises out of the trial court's need to assess
allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in the context of the specific
legal doctrine placed at issue" Id. at ^ 15 (emphasis added). Thus, a defendant may not
object on one ground, and argue a different ground on appeal. See id. at fflj 14-15
(refusing to consider a vagueness challenge raised for the first time on appeal when only
an overbreadth challenge was raised below).

6

Defendant did not raise his constitutional challenges below. The only objection he
raised to his sentence was that imposing a fine would be "somewhat harsh," given his
financial situation. R. 48: 5. Defendant never argued that imposition of afinewould
violate due process the guarantee against excessive fines. Consequently, his
constitutional challenges are unpreserved. See Hardy, 2002 UT App 244 at f 14
(requiring a specific objection to preserve an issue for appeal).
This Court "do[es] not address issues raised for the first time on appeal unless
specific grounds for doing so are presented." State v. Norton, 2003 UT App 88, % 16, 470
Utah Adv. Rep. 9. Those grounds are either "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances."
Id. atffl[10, 16. Defendant fails to argue that "plain error" occurred or that "exceptional
circumstances" exist. Aplt. Br. at 4-8. Therefore, this Court should decline to review
defendant's unpreserved constitutional claims. See Norton, 2003 UT App atfflf10, 16;
State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, % 33, 64 P.3d 1218 (refusing to consider an unpreserved
challenge to a jury instruction because the defendant failed to argue plain error or
exceptional circumstances on appeal).
Even if this Court were to review defendant's claims under the "plain error" or
"exceptional circumstances" exceptions, the claims would fail. "Exceptional
circumstances" arise only when "rare procedural anomalies" occur. See Holgate, 2000
UT 74 at U 12. There were no such "procedural anomalies" in the proceedings below.
Nor could defendant demonstrate that "plain error" occurred. To do so, he would
have to show, among other things, that any error should have been obvious to the trial

7

court. See State v. Dunn 850 P.2d i201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). An error is not obvious
where there is no settled law on the issue. See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah
1992) (relying on the "clarity of the law in this area" to find that the error should have
been obvious); State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259,1f 12, 53 P.3d 486 ("'To show
obviousness of the error [Defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of
trial.'") (quoting State v. Garcia, 2001UT App 19, ^ 6, 18 P.3d 1123) (alteration in
original).
The trial court imposed a fine within the statutory limits. The maximum fine for a
third degree felony is $5,000. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-30l(l)(b) (1999). The maximum
fine for a class C misdemeanor is $750. § 76-3-30l(l)(e). Therefore, the trial court could
have imposed a fine of $5,750. Instead, it imposed a fine of only $1,850 with a potential
credit of up to $925 for any money defendant paid toward an inpatient program. R. 2324. No Utah appellate court has held that a fine that is within the maximum amount a
trial court is authorized to impose may nevertheless be unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the trial court was statutorily required to impose a fine in this case.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44(6)(c)(i) (Supp. 2002). Because this was defendant's
third DUI conviction in ten years, and the trial court suspended execution of his prison
sentence, the trial court was required to impose "a fine of not less than $ 1,500." Id. No
Utah appellate court has held this statute to be unconstitutional. Therefore, given the lack
of settled case law holding that it is unconstitutional to impose a mandatory fine that is
within statutory limits, any error would not have been obvious to the trial court and "plain
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error" could not excuse defendant's failure to preserve the issue. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1208-09; Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786.
B.

In any event, defendant's constitutional claims fail on their
merits.
1. The trial court did not deny defendant due process.

Defendant claims that the trial court violated federal and state guarantees of due
process when it imposed a fine "without consideration of defendant's ability to pay." Id.
at 4. This claim fails because the trial court did consider defendant's ability to pay.
Defendant bears the burden to show that the trial court did not properly consider
all of the relevant factors before pronouncing sentence. See State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,
1f 16, 40 P.3d 626. Defendant cannot carry this burden simply by arguing that he views
his situation differently than the trial court. See id. at ^ 14.
Despite defendant's claim to the contrary, the trial court considered his financial
status before imposing sentence. At sentencing, the trial court had before it a PSI
detailing defendant's financial status. R. 49, 48: 4. The trial court had reviewed the PSI
because it followed the PSPs sentencing recommendation with only minor modifications.
R. 48: 6-7; R. 49: 10. Furthermore, defense counsel emphasized defendant's child
support arrearage and hospital bill in arguing to the trial court that defendant would be
unable to pay the fine recommended in the PSI. R. 48: 5.
The sentence imposed demonstrates that the trial court considered these reports of
defendant's financial situation. Recognizing defendant's financial plight, the trial court
departed from the PSI's recommendation by slightly increasing the imposed fine by $25
9

(from $1,825 to $1,850) but granting defendant an additional $100 in potential credit
against his fine ($925 rather than the recommended $825) if he successftilly completed an
inpatient substance abuse program. R. 23-24; 48; 6-7; 49: 10.
"The fact that [defendant] views his situation differently than did the trial court
does not prove that the trial court neglected to consider the [relevant] factors." See
Helms, 2002 UT 12 at % 14. It is evident that the trial court considered defendant's
financial situation in imposing sentence. Defendant's unsupported claims to the contrary
are insufficient to demonstrate otherwise. See id. Accordingly, defendant's claim fails.
2.

The trial court did not impose an excessive fine.

Defendant also asserts that his fine violated federal and state guarantees against
excessive fines because "the amount of the fine is so disproportionate to [his]
circumstances that there can be no realistic expectation that he will be able to pay the
fine." Id. at 6. The trial court was not constitutionally required, however, to levy a fine
that defendant could afford.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[a] defendant's poverty in no way
immunizes him from punishment." Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 669 (1983).
"'After having taken into consideration the wide range of factors underlying the exercise
of his sentencing function, nothing we now hold precludes a judge from imposing on an
indigent, as on any defendant, the maximum penalty prescribed by law.'" Williams v.
New York, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
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Because the constitution does not prevent a court from imposing the maximum
penalty upon an indigent, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a fine is not excessive if
it is within statutory limits, regardless of the defendant's ability to pay the fine. See State
v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1219-20 (Utah 1984). In Peterson, the defendant was
convicted of a first degree felony and sentenced to a prison term of five years to life,
together with a $10,000 fine. Id. at 1219. He argued that the fine was "excessive under
the circumstances." Id. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the fine was
within the statutory limit. Id. at 1220. The Court so held, despite Justice Stewart's
dissenting opinion that it was improper for the trial court to impose a fine without
consideration of the defendant's ability to pay, and that the case should be remanded for a
specific determination of whether defendant had the ability to pay the fine imposed. Id. at
1222-23 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
As discussed above, the fine in this case was within statutory limits. Although the
trial court could have fined defendant up to $5,750, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-301(1)
(1999), it only imposed a fine of $1,850, with a potential credit of up to $925. R. 23-24.
Moreover, the trial court was statutorily required to impose a fine of at least $1,500,
regardless of his ability to pay. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44(6)(c)(i) (Supp. 2002).
Defendant has not challenged this statute as unconstitutional. Nor does defendant cite to
any statute or case law requiring a Utah court to tailor the amount of a punitive fine to a
defendant's ability to pay.4 Accordingly, defendant's claim fails.
4

In any event, there was substantial evidence that defendant had the ability to pay
an $1,850 fine. Defendant was a certified welder, a member of the United Steel Workers
11

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's sentence should be affirmed.
9 \&

Respectfully submitted this 6U
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Attorney General
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Union, and an experienced welder since at least 1984. R. 49: 7-8. Although he had
recently lost his job, he possessed a letter from his prior employer that "recommended
[him] highly for future employment." R. 49: 13. Defendant was able to post a $5,000
appearance bond and retain counsel to represent him. R. 3, 5, 12. At sentencing, he was
living with his parents, thereby reducing his living expenses. R. 49: 7, 9. Finally, a letter
to the trial courtfromihis daughter stated that he had a 'large support system" of
immediate and extended family. R. 49: 13.
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Addendum A

Addendum A

U.S. Const, amend. VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Utah Const, art. I, § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Utah Const, art. I, § 9
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel
and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-4-44(6) (Supp. 2002)
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is:
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of two or
more prior convictions; or
(ii) at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207that is committed after
July 1,2001; or
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1,
2001.

(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of conviction is
reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of this section.
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of a prison
sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours.
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring the person to
obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse treatment at a substance abuse
treatment program providing intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely
supervised follow-through after treatment for not less than 240 hours.
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the court orders
probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which may include requiring the
person to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in
accordance with Subsection (13).

